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Racism, Eugenics, and Ernst Mayr’s Account of Species 
Ladelle McWhorter 
SPEP 2009, Arlington Key Bridge Marriott, Virginia 
 
     At his death at age one hundred in 2005, Ernst Mayr was hailed as the greatest 
evolutionary biologist of the twentieth century.i His definition of species, published in 
1942 in Systematics and the Origin of Species and known as the “biological species 
concept,” is familiar to every tenth grader: “Species are groups of interbreeding natural 
populations that are reproductively isolated from other such groups.” ii That definition, 
together with Mayr’s and Theodosius Dobzhansky’s theory of speciation, enabled the 
integration of modern genetics and Darwinian evolutionary theory. In this paper I will 
argue that it imported racism into the heart of modern genetics as well. 
     In a classic 1963 essay, Mayr traces three meanings of the word species.iii First is the 
Platonic: Individuals are instantiations of an unchanging type; species are durable types 
and the proper object of natural philosophy. Linnaeus—the eighteenth century Swedish 
naturalist who developed the system of classification of beings into genera and species 
still used in modified form today—believed in species in this Platonic sense and devised 
his taxonomy to delineate them. A second meaning of the term species was put forth by 
the nominalist Occam, who claimed that the names of taxa, like all universal or class 
concepts, are abstractions from experience of a number of seemingly similar individuals. 
Neither of these concepts of species is satisfactory, Mayr claims. On the one hand, the 
real world contains something more than unrelated particulars; all horses really are 
related in some way that accounts for their anatomical and functional similarities. But, on 
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the other hand, empirical scientists have little use for transcendent categories like Horse-
ness. Modern biology required a better definition. 
     Mayr credits the eighteenth century naturalist Comte de Buffon with the idea that 
species can be distinguished consistently using empirical criteria. Buffon held that two 
classes of entity can be considered distinct species if cross-breeding is either: (1) 
impossible, (2) sterile, or (3) productive of sterile offspring. Morphological dissimilarity 
renders cross-breeding impossible in most cases; the issue of species difference only 
arose in classical natural history where morphological similarity made sexual contact 
possible. Buffon’s criterion dealt with just such cases, erecting conceptual boundaries 
that were empirically grounded. Horses and asses are distinct species despite 
morphological similarities, Buffon held, because cross-breeding, where fertile, results 
consistently in sterile hybrids, namely, mules. 
     Mayr finds Buffon’s account of species boundaries more than merely practical and 
empirically warranted; he finds it positively prescient, because it points to what he and 
his contemporary geneticists believed was a crucial evolutionary fact: Species comprise 
distinct gene pools; species are genetic populations. Horses and asses are not one species, 
because while there may be some genetic mixing in a few individuals (mules), across the 
two populations there is no intergenerational gene flow. Between species there are what 
Mayr and Dobzhansky called “reproductive isolating mechanisms,” physiological or 
behavioral barriers to genetic mixing including such mechanisms as different estrus or 
hibernation or migration cycles, different courtship behaviors or mating calls, or different 
physical bases for sexual selection. In evolving species these mechanisms gradually stop 
gene flow from sibling populations and give subspecies a chance to become “good 
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species” (Mayr’s term, harking back to Darwin’s use of the phrase), that is, to establish 
separate gene pools. Hence, descriptions of species taxa entail descriptions of their 
reproductive isolating mechanisms.  
     Although Buffon’s assertion that species identification is a matter of interfertility won 
general acceptance by the nineteenth century, it did not settle the questions of either the 
essential nature or the origin of species. Like Occam, Buffon was a nominalist; in nature, 
he believed, there were only individuals, not classes.iv And the question of origins was 
not one that greatly exercised most eighteenth century naturalists, even those who 
believed taxa were real entities, because most assumed divine creation and fixity.v In the 
nineteenth century, however, as theology lost ground in science and the impact of the 
new discipline of geology began to be felt, the questions of the nature and origin of 
species became increasingly urgent. 
     Nowhere was that urgency felt more intensely than in the US with its “peculiar 
institution” of chattel slavery. The abolition movement became a political force by 1832, 
putting slavery’s proponents on the defensive as never before. For new rationales, they 
turned to science. Negroes were simply not fellow human beings, they argued, for 
Negroes and Caucasians were in fact distinct species. Whether that argument was 
plausible turned, in part, on the definition of species. 
     In 1843, Josiah Nott argued that Mulattoes were sterile hybrids like mules. Having 
worked for fifteen years as a physician to many Negroes (he served the wealthy families 
of Mobile, so he also treated their slaves), Nott claimed to have observed not only 
morphological differences between blacks and whites but also peculiarities in Mulattoes 
that rendered them less healthy, shorter-lived, and less fertile than Negroes and 
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Caucasians. In particular, he observed, mulatto women are “bad breeders and bad 
nurses—many of them do not conceive at all—most are subject to abortions, and a large 
portion of their children die at an early age.”vi Each generation of mulattos is weaker and 
less able to procreate until, by the fourth, the line dies out. By thus bending Buffon’s 
criterion—progressively lessened fecundity rather than absolute sterility in the 
offspring—and by offering only anecdotal evidence, Nott made it appear that racial 
crosses met the definition of hybrid and, therefore, that Negroes and Caucasians could be 
considered different species. On the strength of this altered definition of species, between 
1846 and 1850 most American scientists converted to polygeny. Thus was the concept 
species refashioned to serve as a tool for perpetuating racial oppression.  
     But in the 1860s, the theory of natural selection that Darwin propounded in Origin of 
the Species reopened the definition debate.vii Some maintained—as did Darwin 
himselfviii—that the concept was meaningless. There are neither eternally fixed types nor 
distinct lines of descent. All life, no matter how morphologically or functionally distinct 
now, conceivably could be traced to a single germ line. Still, biologists needed some way 
to mark obvious differences and similarities between synchronically existing organisms, 
so the term species remained salient. The question became: How much difference (and of 
what sort) was sufficient to call a group of organisms a species distinct to others, 
including its own ancestors? Despite the title of his book, Ernst Mayr points out, Darwin 
never gave an account of speciation.ix He argued that species must change, but he did not 
say when change amounts to the birth of a new species. In short, he never answered the 
question of the origin of species. 
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     Regardless, Darwin’s theory quickly took hold, and its consonance with prevailing 
notions of technological, intellectual, and moral progress frequently resulted in conflation 
of evolutionary modification with evolutionary advancement. Darwin himself sometimes 
spoke of adaptation as improvement, as if species were on a path to perfection, as if there 
were an ultimate standard against which their present state could be evaluated. 
     Natural selection, adherents agreed, was responsible for some amazing feats. Not only 
had it produced millions of organisms remarkable for their physiological adaptations to 
their environment, but it had even produced one animal able to vary its environment by 
conscious decision. Natural selection had produced the rational animal Homo sapiens, 
and Homo sapiens had produced “civilization.” Civilization was a biological 
developmental outcome, a species character (to use the language of natural history).  
     Of course, enthusiasts acknowledged, this process was incomplete. Many members of 
the species were inadequately adapted to a civilized environment. Some groups—
Africans, Pacific Islanders, indigenous peoples of North and South America—had never 
evolved sufficiently to produce a civilization, European and North American theorists 
believed, so it was unlikely they could adapt to its demands. But even among the “higher 
races,” there were individuals who could not adapt—criminals, idiots, the mad, the 
degenerate, the chronically ill. Like the “lower races,” these individuals were weaklings 
that natural selection must eliminate. 
     If allowed to. As the nineteenth century drew to a close and the new century 
commenced, fear began to settle over the Caucasian elite. Natural selection had brought 
the human species far, but was humanity still evolving, or was the very civilization that 
evolution had produced circumventing the evolutionary process? After all, technology 
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made it possible to save lives, allowing people with inferior traits to mature. And modern 
morality, expressed in charity toward the weak, enabled the defective to procreate. 
Humanity’s evolutionary avant garde might find itself swamped by the rising tide of 
inferiority that its own intelligence and generosity had made possible.  
     One theorist who warned of these dire possibilities was Madison Grant. Civilization, 
Grant insisted in 1916, had evolved only under the harshest of environmental conditions 
where people were forced to innovate, reason, cooperate, and plan ahead or die. “The 
climatic conditions must have been such as to impose a rigid elimination of defectives 
through the agency of hard winters and the necessity of industry and foresight in 
providing the year’s food clothing and shelter during the short summer…. Such demands 
on energy, if long continued, would produce a strong, virile, and self-contained race….”x 
In Paleolithic times these conditions obtained, Grant believed, along the Baltic Sea. The 
race that evolved there gradually migrated northwestward to become the Nordics or 
Teutons. As they advanced in technological competence and overwhelmed less intelligent 
and less fit races, they spread farther, crossing the North Sea to populate the British 
Isles—in the process becoming the Anglo-Saxons—and then eventually crossing the 
Atlantic to become the Anglo-Americans. The evolutionary avant garde of the twentieth 
century were, therefore, the New England blue-bloodlines to which Grant himself 
belonged. 
     And the rising tide of inferiority was everybody else. Civilization could only be saved 
if that tide was stemmed, and that would require virile Anglo-Saxon resolve, for “[t]he 
laws of nature require the obliteration of the unfit….”xi Aid to the poor, weak, and 
disabled was out of the question. Grant advocated sterilization for the criminal, diseased, 
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insane, and for those he termed “worthless race types,” meaning Jews, blacks, and 
indigenous peoples. Negroes were especially objectionable. “Negroes have demonstrated 
throughout recorded time that they are a stationary species, and that they do not possess 
the potential of progress or initiative from within.”xii By whatever means necessary, they 
should be kept apart from Nordics to prevent corruption of Nordic bloodlines. Further, 
immigration should be restricted to keep out Eastern and Southern Europeans—members 
of the Mediterranean and Alpine races as distinct to the Nordic.xiii Grant’s friend Lothrop 
Stoddard wholeheartedly agreed. “The admission of aliens should be regarded just as 
solemnly as the begetting of children, for the racial effect is essentially the same,” he 
wrote in 1920. “Immigration is thus, from the racial standpoint, a form of procreation, 
and like the more immediate form of procreation it may be either the greatest blessing or 
the greatest curse.”xiv  
     In 1917, these influential men and their allies won passage of a new immigration law 
instituting literacy tests, caps on total numbers of immigrants, national quotas, and denial 
of entry in cases of penury, feeblemindedness, moral degeneracy, and “constitutional 
psychopathy”—non-delusional insanity—the last effectively screening out anyone who 
did not conform to prevailing gender norms or admitted to homosexual desire. Further, 
any immigrant who, during the first five years of residence in the US, committed a crime 
or showed signs of any allegedly hereditary physical or mental defect could be deported. 
In 1924 further restrictions limited the annual number of immigrants to 150,000, 
apportioned by percentage of resident immigrants from each nation as counted in the 
1890 census—pointedly before the massive influx of from Poland, Hungary, Russia, and 
Italy. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1924 made the US the most exclusive country 
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in the world. Its provisions, developed in the name of racial purity and Nordic 
civilization, remained in effect well past the mid-twentieth century. 
     The Anglo-Saxon race bore the genes that produced civilization. It could not allow 
those genes to be swamped by what Stoddard called the “rising tide of color” from 
outside the country, nor by degenerate, feebleminded defectives in inner cities and rural 
shanties. Just as the tide must be forced back with the dikes of immigration restriction, it 
must be stemmed from within by a set of laws and policies designed to segregate the unfit 
and, where necessary, insure their sterility. The dikes of racial segregation had to be 
strengthened. Likewise, the dikes of intellectual and moral segregation had to be erected 
and maintained. 
     In the 1910s state governments undertook population surveys to determine the extent 
of the “menace of the feebleminded” and made provisions to confine “it” in sex-
segregated institutions and farm colonies. Hundreds of thousands were locked up for life 
in this effort to offset a perceived threat to natural selection and the evolution of the 
human species. But still the tides of inferiority rose. If civilization was to survive and 
advance, those most evolved must turn their technologies to the task of eliminating once 
and for all the defective genes that threatened to swamp their own. Eugenically alert 
physicians had been quietly sterilizing defectives in prisons, hospitals, and asylums since 
the 1880s, a practice that grew with the introduction of vasectomy and salpingectomy in 
the 1890s. In 1927 in Buck v. Bell, the US Supreme Court endorsed these eugenic 
measures. By 1972, the number of Americans legally sterilized without their consent 
would reach 65,000.xv Thus were the enemies of the species eliminated and Homo 
sapiens’ evolutionary advance safeguarded and insured. 
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     The Nazis took lessons from American eugenicists, basing their 1934 sterilization law 
on Harry Laughlin’s 1922 Model Eugenical Sterilization Law.xvi  By 1937, they had 
sterilized 250,000 Germans and won the admiration of their American tutors. Soon 
thereafter they dispensed with the generational delay and began to eliminate defectives 
outright through eugenic “euthanasia.” 
     Although no North American government ever enacted a policy of eugenic killing, the 
specter of “euthanasia” always haunted the eugenics movement. Given the assumptions 
animating it, adherents could not help but consider the possibility. In an address to the 
Medical Association of the State of Alabama in 1936, Dr. William Partlow reminded his 
audience that, “Until medical science improved social, public health and sanitary 
conditions, nature’s survival of the fittest defended the human race against the dangers of 
degeneracy. Now that under the present order of a humane world, the weak are preserved 
as well as the strong, if we are to continue as a virile, upstanding race in body and mind, 
eugenics demands its share of study and attention or euthanasia may become a 
necessity.”xvii  
     But as Nazism became more widely understood in the US such measures lost appeal. 
The eugenics movement lowered its profile and changed its tactics. Frederick Osborn, a 
driving force in the transformation of eugenics through mid-century, warned eugenicists 
against speaking of species improvement in racial terms. “It would be unwise for 
eugenists to impute superiorities or inferiorities of a biological nature to social classes, to 
regional groups, or to races as a whole,” he wrote in 1937. 
Scientists are not at all sure that any races or social classes in this country 
are above or below others in biological capacity for developing socially 
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valuable qualities. But they are sure that even if there are differences 
between the average biological capacities of such groups, they are small 
compared to the much greater differences existing between individuals. 
Eugenics should therefore operate on a basis of individual selection. A 
program of selection of the best individuals and the best family stock, 
from every race and socio-economic class, will have wide scientific 
support.xviii 
Osborn enlarged upon this position in his 1940 book Preface to Eugenics, maintaining 
that eugenics is only viable in a democracy where individuals are respected. 
The eugenics ideal recognizes that each human being is by his heredity 
unique. This uniqueness, which pervades every cell in his body, justifies 
respect for the individual. … Eugenics, in asserting the uniqueness of the 
individual, supplements the American ideal of respect for the individual. 
Eugenics in a democracy seeks not to breed men to a single type, but to 
raise the average level of human variations, reducing variations tending 
toward poor health, low intelligence, and anti-social character, and 
increasing variations at the highest levels of activity.xix 
The Nazis sought to breed a single type of person, conformity to one phenotypic ideal. 
But, ultimately, breeding programs of that sort are dysgenic, because they do not select 
for the variations that will really enable the human species to advance—strength, 
intelligence, and socially valuable conduct. We must renounce naïve, phenotypic racism, 
Osborn argued, concentrating instead on eliminating inferior genotypes and cultivating 
superior genotypes wherever they are found.xx 
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     It is commonly believed that eugenics and the dream of a purified master race died 
with Hitler; modern genetics stepped in, corrected the scientific misperceptions that had 
powered the race purification movement at the turn of the century, and by the 1930s 
thoroughly discredited eugenics as a pseudo-science. But the historical facts are less 
reassuring. The science Frederick Osborn appealed to in 1937 was not eugenics. It was 
genetics, the science of men like Thomas Hunt Morgan, Theodosius Dobzhansky, and 
Ernst Mayr. And when he claimed scientific support for his eugenic position, he knew 
what he was talking about. The project of eliminating defect through managed breeding 
was embraced by many geneticists, even while race-based discrimination was opposed. 
The preface to Osborn’s 1968 book The Future of Human Heredity was written by 
Theodosius Dobzhansky, one of the greatest geneticists of the twentieth century. 
Dobzhansky acknowledged that “zealous proponents” had hindered the acceptance of 
eugenics as a practice. “And yet,” he maintained, “eugenics has a sound core. The real 
problem which mankind will not be able to evade indefinitely is where the evolutionary 
process is taking man, and where man himself wishes to go. Mr. Osborn has for several 
decades been the clear-sighted leader of the eugenical movement in America, who strove 
to make the substance of eugenics scientific and its name respectable again.”xxi 
Geneticists of the highest rank did not reject eugenics after World War II. Seemingly 
purged of racism, eugenics was not only accepted but championed. 
     But how successful was that purge? Recall Mayr: “Species are groups of interbreeding 
natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other such groups.”xxii A species 
consists of a collection of individuals capable of fertile sexual contact with one another, a 
population with a single “gene pool.” Combinations of DNA as they exist in individuals 
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can be reshuffled through sexual reproduction to create a new population of individuals, 
the next generation, but the gene pool itself remains intact.xxiii Evolution affects not the 
individuals but the gene pool through mutation and genetic drift; natural selection acts on 
the pool, altering it over time. But as long as it remains isolated from other gene pools, 
successive populations are one distinct species.  
     It may be hard to see politics in Mayr’s populations and pools. But consider his 
discussion of speciation. In order to be a “good species,” a gene pool must dam itself off 
from alien flows. A species-in-the-making (a variety in process of becoming a “good 
species”) must evolve “reproductive isolating mechanisms”xxiv; it must erect barriers to 
fertile sexual contact with neighboring varieties. 
     There are empirical difficulties with this account of species. It renders asexual 
organisms non-specific. It may count morphologically distinct groups—such as red and 
black oaks—as one species, thus failing to square with taxonomic speciation. xxv It makes 
identification of extinct species difficult by undermining morphology as a reliable 
indicator of speciation. But one of the most serious criticisms was raised by Hugh 
Paterson in 1976.xxvi Everyone agrees, Paterson says, that speciation can occur when one 
species is split into two geographically separated areas for a long time. Different 
environments select for different alleles until the two groups are genetically and 
morphologically distinct. This is speciation in allopatry. But can speciation occur in 
sympatry—can one species become two distinct species within the same environment? 
Yes, say Dobzhansky and Mayr, because a subset of the species can evolve reproductive 
isolating mechanisms that dam off the gene flow from the parent species. Once these are 
in place, we have two gene pools and so two species. No, says Paterson, because the 
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processes of natural selection would never favor any trait that makes most offspring of 
the developing subgroup effectively sterile. Reproductive isolating mechanisms simply 
cannot evolve, he maintains, at least not as essential components of the process of 
speciation in sympatry. If they do evolve, they are incidental to the operation of natural 
selection in favor of other adaptive traits.xxvii Furthermore, by making reproductive 
isolation an essential feature of speciation, adherents of Mayr’s biological species 
concept import teleology into the theory of natural selection. Nature wants diversity of 
species they imply, because, as Dobzhansky puts it, “the living world has deployed itself 
to master a progressively greater range of environments and ways of living.”xxviii 
Speciation is life’s way of colonizing new environments in a drive to conquer the planet. 
Paterson views this as an illegitimate assumption in a scientific theory. Life has no aims, 
he maintains. Nature does not select for diversity but for fecundity, the opposite of 
sterility; diversity occurs as a side-effect. Thus we cannot make intersterility an essential 
component of the definition of species. 
     Why, then, has the biological species concept reigned? The answer lies not in its 
biological value but in its social value; it is a reflection of a society in which Jim Crow 
racism was in full force, preoccupation with miscegenation was pervasive, and fears of 
hereditary degeneracy abounded. Racial segregation and immigration restriction, as well 
as eugenic institutionalization and sterilization of the “unfit,” were all about damming the 
gene flow from suspect segments of the larger population in order to isolate the (straight, 
white, middle-class) sub-population reproductively to produce a “good species” exclusive 
of—to use the language of the day—Negroes, Asiatics, defectives, and perverts. The 
process of speciation as Mayr and Dobzhansky describe it is, precisely, the project of 
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twentieth-century eugenics. Even their fluid metaphors come from the prevailing eugenic 
discourse: Stoddard’s image of the rising tide of color swamping the vessels of Nordic 
germ plasm is not far in the background, and his repeated calls for dikes to protect the 
Nordic race from contamination by its presumed inferiors might have been the prototype 
for the very concept of reproductive isolating mechanisms damming off foreign gene 
flows. DNA is not fluid. Twentieth-century geneticists’ ubiquitous use of water 
metaphors was not descriptive; it was evocative of the eugenics discourses out of which 
genetics grew and to which it remained attached. 
     Eugenicists were trying to create a new (super)human species by managing sexual 
behavior and restricting sexual contact; geneticists thus imagined that all new species 
were created that way. Far from abandoning eugenics in the 1940s, then, biologists raised 
the basic principles of eugenic practice to the status of natural law, which they 
incorporated into the heart of their new disciplinary synthesis. What lesson should we 
draw from this story of biology’s intimate relationship with eugenics?  
     Those who would seek to capture this history and contain it within the confines of the 
prevailing epistemology—about which I will speak momentarily with a nod toward the 
work of Michel Foucault and Isabelle Stengers and, thus, to Gilles Deleuzexxix—have a 
couple of strategic options. One is simply to reject the claim that the biological species 
concept and the theory of speciation that it enables and in which it is embedded were ever 
adequately warranted, to lament the fact that now and then even great scientists allow 
their biases to affect their work, and to pay homage to the mechanisms of scientific 
discourse that allow and provoke Paterson’s and others’ corrective critique. Another is to 
argue that, regardless of their ultimate truth-value or socio-political analogues, Mayr’s 
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and Dobzhansky’s theories had adequate scientific warrant when they were proposed and 
accepted.  
     In different ways, both these strategies operate to reinstate a distinction that the story 
itself calls into question: the distinction between science’s inside and its outside. Inside 
scientific practice, these strategic assertions imply, there are claims and sets of standards 
that order thought “scientifically.” Outside scientific practice, there are claims and sets of 
standards that order thought “unscientifically,” “politically,” or “irrationally.” Science 
functions well when the inside and the outside are not allowed to mix. But whenever 
what is outside gets inside and contaminates scientific practice, there is trouble, and the 
story I have told this afternoon is an example of just such a situation.  
     But is not this very distinction between pure inside and distinct outside itself a product 
of eugenic thinking? Does it not rest on a eugenic desire to purify our knowledge as a 
means to insure scientific advance? What would happen if we allowed ourselves to 
entertain the thought that modern genetics, indeed all of modern biology and therefore 
much of our contemporary intellectual and technological world, is conditioned by 
scientific racism? Would the raft of science be swamped by the rising tide of politics? 
What if, instead of shoring up the dikes meant to prevent intimacy and flow between 
science and politics, we took the self-overcoming step of acknowledging our assertions of 
scientific fastidiousness as a political strategy? How would we live with these thoughts? 
How would these thoughts transform us? 
     Thank you.      
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